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Romania. That way at least the employer would fully partake in the Romanian social system and its workers would be able to enjoy their social and family life in the place where they belong.
A trade union advocating offshoring: removal of employment from the territory -that's new indeed. But the principled position taken by the FNV in this case is that the union opposes -and from their position should oppose -the dis-embedding of employment relationships.
In this contribution I explore the problematic of the posting of workers within the EU from the perspective of 'embeddedness'. Does this perspective provide new insights in the problem? The regulatory mechanisms which apply to posted workers are placed in the framework of 'embedding' -thus shedding more light on the concept itself. Reversely, the concept is used as a tool to understand the current problems and evaluate the solution proposed by the commission in its proposal for revision of the posting of workers directive.
Embeddedness in the face of international mobility of workers and services
The term 'disembedded employment' carries with it a clear image of dislocation -of taking the employment relationship out of its wider social context. The term borrows from political economy and refers to the work of Karl Polanyi, Mark Granovetter and John Ruggie. 3 The term 'embeddedness' was coined by Polanyi in his seminal work 'The great transformation' of 1944. 4 The main thesis underlying the concept is that the 'economic' is not self-steering and self-contained but is embedded in a larger institutional framework, a set of rules and practices that have been put in place through a social and/or political process. 5 In sociology the term is used in a descriptive manner -as a tool to study the real interactions and incentives that shape the market. In the work of Ruggie et al on embedded liberalism the focus is more normative and turns to the interaction between market liberalization and political and social intervention. In the Polanyian paradigm any attempt to liberate the market from the constraints of regulation and social steering will be met with a regulatory counter movement. Hence the commodification of labour in the EU -the fact the labour mobility is part and parcel of the market freedoms -is met by efforts to contain this 'market' by some form of regulation which should guarantee that transnational economic activity is not only beneficial to (one of) the participants, but to society at large.
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In the EU, even at this more advanced stage, social regulation is largely left to the member states. The EU has adopted measures in the area of restructuring, equal treatment and safety and health. 6 But the more distributive function of social law (wage levels, taxation and premium setting, social benefits and social protection) is exercised at the national level. Despite calls for a 'European minimum wage', 7 the EU doesn't and cannot under the Treaties intervene in wage setting and social protection. 8 Also the sensitive area of industrial relations falls outside of the competences of the EU. Accordingly the national systems are responsible for embedding the market on which personal labour is traded for income.
Both the production of goods and services and the provision of labour itself are reined in by the national systems of labour relations, labour law, tax law, social security and social protection. This leads to different levels of embeddedness or -to use another common term -to varieties of capitalism. 9 Hence, in the case of transnational employment the question of embeddedness takes on an element of geographical distribution: in which system or systems should the transnational employment relationship be embedded? This question is linked to a more fundamental one: to what extent does the liberalization of services undermine the regulatory powers of the state as such -reducing the impact of both home and host state in the case of transnational employment?
From the literature on migration we learn that migration leads to different degrees of 'belonging' to, of solidarity with and involvement in the home state and the host state respectively. Migrants may maintain a strong link with the home state, or rather lose interest in their country of origin. They may acquire a sense of belonging in the host state, or rather remain detached from it. Put on different axis, this leads to four types of migrational belonging -from the double bond of the integrated migrant who also maintains close ties with the home state to the footloose new nomad who doesn't feel integrated in any one society. 10 A similar pattern can be discerned with regard to the employment relation proper. 11 The long term migrant worker enters the labour market of the host state and enters into an employment contract there. This contract will exclusively be regulated by the labour laws of the host state -even when the 5 migrant may still be linked to the home state for social security or tax purposes. The employment contract of the truck-driver who passes through a country between his home state and the end destination of the goods, however, will have no or hardly any relevant connections with the transit state. Some labour relations are even scattered to such an extent that they do not seem to belong anywhere -the employment through manning agencies of seamen from cheap labour countries for work on ships flying a flag of convenience being a case in point. These employment relations can only be effectively embedded in a transnational legal order -a role which for maritime labour is performed by the maritime labour convention of 2006. 12 Currently no comparable mechanism exists in any other sector of the economy, either at global or European level.
Where the sense of belonging of the migrant is very personal, the embeddedness of his economic activities has a distinct legal aspect. Here the coordination of legal systems through private international law, international tax law and international social security comes into play. 13 All these systems do -to some extent -distribute the power to regulate the transnational employment relationship over the countries with a relevant connection to the case at hand.
The normal 'topos' of the employment relationship: the place of work.
With regard to law applying to an international employment relationship an important role is played by the Rome I Regulation. This regulation determines the applicable law to contractual obligations. Employment relations are treated as weaker party contracts and submitted to a special protective conflicts rule. Under this rule, the parties themselves may choose the law to be applied to their contract. This choice, however, cannot deprive the employee of the protection afforded to him by mandatory provisions of the law applicable in absence of such choice. The latter law, commonly referred to as the 'objectively applicable law' is found by determining the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract. Hence the employment contract is embedded in the legal system of the habitual place of work, even during temporary postings abroad. By referring to the habitual place of work, rather than the actual place of work, this provision stabilizes the law applying to the employment contract: during a temporary posting, the law of the home state remains applicable. The host country may regulate some aspects of the performance of the contract, but its law is not lex causae -the law governing the contract as such.
The regulation contains no clear indication as to the question when a posting stops being temporary, making the host country the new 'habitual place of work'. Thus far, any attempt to specify this term failed, though the preamble to the Rome I regulation does contain some indications as to the elements to be taken into consideration. Hence the regulation does not include a time limit for temporary postings, which may have a duration of months and even years. All that time the host state is not fully 'in charge' of the employment relationship evolving within its territory.
6
Also other elements of the regulation impact on the regulatory power of the state in which the work is actually performed. Article 8(3) Rome I contains an alternative reference rule in case the country where the work is habitually carried out cannot be identified. In that case the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated. This rule will not be used much as the ECJ has developed a very wide concept of the 'habitual place of work' which would cover most employment situations. Only peripatic workers, whose work has no stable link to any jurisdiction, seem to be covered by this provision. From a legal perspective these cases represent the penultimate form of disembeddesness.
14 A more important deviation is caused by the interpretation by the ECJ of Article 8(4) Rome I. This provision declares that both pre-established connecting factors -habitual place of work and engaging place of business -may be set aside where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected to another country, in which case the law of that other country shall apply. In the Schlecker case this rule was applied to a contract that had been performed in the Netherlands for over ten years. The parties and the courts dealing with the case were in agreement that the habitual place of work of the employee was located in the Netherlands. Yet in the end Germany was deemed to have a closer connection with the contract, mainly because both employer and worker were resident there and the worker was (voluntarily) submitted to the German system of taxes, social security, pension and insurance schemes. One could argue that in this case the wider social embedding of the employee clearly pointed to Germany. However, the performance of the contract was strongly linked to the Dutch labour market. As the multilateral choice of law rules designate one country's -and only one country's -law to apply, a choice has to be made between these two types of embedding.
The Schlecker case draws our attention to the importance of the social security and tax position of a mobile worker. In the EU the application of the national social security legislation is coordinated by 25 This exception is not made for the benefit of the employee but rather protects the employer against double fiscal burdens and loss of tax deductions. 26 In the scheme of the OECD Tax Convention the tax position of the employing enterprise is a crucial factor in deciding on the tax position of the employee. 27 Unlike Regulation 883/2004, the Model Convention does not contain a special rule with regard to long term posting. But, again, the Schlecker case suggests that such long term exception are (or were) in fact made. 28 But again these extensions are hardly relevant for temporary postings in the context of the EU free movement of services. With the average duration of posting being 4 months, these postings stays well within the 183 days limit. More important, however, is that both home state and host state may grant special tax reductions in case of cross-border employment. These mechanisms compensate the employer for the extra costs of sending workers abroad but also grant him a transnationality bonus. In the FNV case described in the introduction, the Romanian employer hardly paid any taxes and premiums in Romania because of a special deduction for costs -leaving the worker with only a taxable income that was below minimum standards even in Romania. The deductions are a type of export subsidy on labour. These subsidies increase the competitiveness of the national industry but come at the expense of the tax and premium base -as well as the insurance position of the posted workers.
This overview of the existing coordination mechanisms demonstrate that there is a clear acknowledgement that the place where the work is performed is the normal topos of embeddedness of the employment relationship: the importance ascribed to the place of work in private international law finds a parallel in the coordination rules with regard to taxation and social security in cross-border cases. However, in all systems short changes in the actual place of work do not alter the 'habitual place of work'. This creates a level of continuity with regard to the applicable law. In terms of embeddedness: short trips abroad do not disrupt the long-term embeddedness of the individual worker and his employment relationship in the country of origin. The three coordination systems all have their own cutoff point for temporary postings and their own loopholes for extension of the posting period, but the 25 The calculus is based on days spent within the territory of the state in which the work is actually performed -see OECD comment to Article 15. http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-taxconvention-on-income-and-on-capital-2014-full-version/commentary-on-article-15-concerning-the-taxation-ofincome-from-employment_9789264239081-49-en#.V49vKk1f3cs#page9 C(15) paragraph 5. See for the adoption of this rule in a tax treaty: Article 15 of the US-German convention for the avoidance of double taxation 1990 -https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/germany.pdf. 26 Commentary C(15) paragraph 6.2. 27 http://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/verdragsstaten_ib_ingezetenen_ib4001z4fd.pdf 28 See also http://www.awvn.nl/themas/internationale-arbeidsmobiliteit/informatie/30-regeling 9 mechanisms are similar. 29 Yet already here, a slight difference in orientation is evident. Choice of law seeks to embed the contract, whereas the other two mechanisms tend to focus on the worker, and to some extent on the employer. But all lead to a situation in which not all work performed within the territory of country A is subject to A's laws, be it employment laws, tax laws and/or social security.
From migration controls to conflict of laws
It is important to realize that the Rome I Regulation applies to both intra-EU cases and cases with external elements. But the context in which the labour migration takes place is radically different.
Outside the context of the internal market labour migration can be and often effectively is controlled by both the home state and the host state. Before accession to the EU, several central and Eastern European countries actively regulated the employment of nationals in other countries both through a system of emigration permits and through the application of home state law to the contract of expatriated citizens. 30 Accession blocked both ways of regulation, as the permits were not compatible with the free movement provisions of the TFEU, whereas the national conflict of laws rules were succeeded by the rules of the Rome Convention (currently replaced by the Rome I Regulation) and the PWD. 31 The combined effect was a sharply reduced influence of the home state on outgoing labour migration. Reversely the old member states, upon accession of the new member states, could no longer control labour migration from these countries to their territory. Engblom describes how the Swedish trade unions are actively involved in the granting of work permits to non-EU workers. They are not only involved in setting the number of permits granted, but also in safeguarding the working conditions these mobile workers should enjoy. The conditions under which the permits are granted include respect for the Swedish collective agreements applicable in the sector. As a result non-EU labour migration to Sweden is very much embedded in the Swedish system of industrial relations. Other old member states likewise control both the influx of foreign workers themselves and the conditions under which they are employed -though in other cases the involvement of the unions might be less pronounced or absent.
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Upon accession, this control was lost with respect to all types of migration of the citizens of the new member states as well as in case of intra-EU posting of non-EU workers. It is replaced by a less than perfect coordination system which is largely based on the interchangeability of national systems. States. The applicable law rules were contained in the Rome Convention, which was superseded in 2009 by the Rome I Regulation. 32 Compare also the system imposed by Directive 2014/66/EU on the conditions of entry and residence of thirdcountry nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer. This directive provides in its Article 5(4)(b) that third country nationals must be given a remuneration "not less favourable than the remuneration granted to nationals of the Member State where the work is carried out occupying comparable positions" to avoid distortion of competition between companies having (or not) subsidiaries in different Member States.
In truth, the national systems of labour law are anything but interchangeable -especially with regard to wage levels. These differences in regulation between the Member States in combination with the freedoms inherent to the internal market create the possibility of regulatory arbitrage: economic actors may use their economic freedoms to change the law applying to them. When a company relocates its production facility from country A to country B, this will affect the labour law and social security position of the workers employed within the facility. This type of regulatory arbitrage 33 as a result of market integration is widely accepted. The same phenomenon is much more controversial when the regulatory arbitrage plays out within a single Member State. 34 There are several ways in which employers may engage in regulatory arbitrage without actually changing the place of work. The main ones are 1. Establishing a separate legal entity in a Member State with low labour costs and using intracompany transfers or the (intra-company) provision of services to deploy workers in the host state 2. Subcontracting to a foreign service provider established in the low cost country 3. Hiring of manpower through a foreign temporary employment agency established in a low cost country.
These constructions, in combination with the coordination rules described above, lead to legal distinctions between groups of workers that don't necessarily match the facts on the ground. For example: for choice of law purposes there is a big difference between Romanian workers who are employed at the shipyard through a Dutch temporary work agency -they qualify as migrant workers and their contracts are governed by Dutch law -and similar workers employed through a Romanian agency -who may be deemed to be posted worker or otherwise employed under Romanian law. The workers themselves might not even realize they are in different legal positions. 35 They might be equally disinterested in the Dutch labour market and the Dutch system of industrial relations. And the impact of their employment on Dutch market is identical. But legally the posted workers are set apart from the work force of the host state by the coordination rules described above. In the literature this effect is 33 The term 'regulatory arbitrage' refers to the possibility that economic actors use differences between legal systems to create a competitive advantage. 'Regulatory competition' occurs when as a result of the arbitrage, countries adapt their laws to change their position on the 'market of legal systems described as the creation of 'extra legal zones', 'islands of foreign law' or 'odd transnational deregulated space, outside the neo-corporatist or statist system of labor market regulation of the host country, while physically very much on the territory of this receiving country. 36 Some of these descriptions use a unilateral host-state perspective on dis-embedding. They are concerned with the question of regulating the labour market as such and the jobs that are part of that market. In that perspective, posting of workers is but one of the possibilities the employer can avail himself of when he wants to escape the regulatory framework of the place of work. The effect on the local labour market is thought to be similar to the replacement of workers under a contract of employment by (mock) self-employed workers or the use of undeclared work. In this strictly unilateral perspective, the application of foreign law to the contract is put on a par with an absence of labour standards. However, as the term 'extra legal zones' suggests and the tax law example demonstrates, the transnationality of the employment relationship may indeed decrease the level of embeddedness of the individual relationship as well. How did this disembedding come about and how did the member states of the EU respond to it?
Re-embedding the transnational employment relationship -the early days
The late 80's and early 90's were a special period for the topic of transnational employment. In 1986 Portugal and Spain acceded to the European Economic Community. Aware that the wage difference between these two new member states and the original member states was considerable, the accession treaty contained a transition period in which the free movement of workers was still restricted, whereas the provision of services was already liberalized. This partial liberalization led to the famous Rush Portuguesa judgment of 1990 in which the court of justice stipulated that the movement of workers in the context of the provision of services is part of the latter freedom. Posted workers do not -as a ruleenter the labour market of the host state and therefore cannot be treated as migrant workers.
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Accordingly their employment relationship is not fully submitted to the laws of the host state. But the influx of these workers and the conditions under which they are employed are no longer controlled by immigration rules either. In some host states this created a gap in the regulatory framework which economic circumstances would soon expose.
The Rush Portuguesa judgment was given against the back drop of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, followed by the reunification of Germany 1990. This geopolitical event led to a construction boom in Berlin. However, due to massive offshoring of construction activities to subsidiaries in other Member States the growth in building activities did not benefit German construction workers, unemployment levels amongst those workers reaching a peak in the early 90's. In a book published in 2005 Georg Menz describes the re-regulatory responses in nine northern member states. All of these states were characterized by a thick embeddedness of the employment contract, but the precise response to the opening up of their labour markets depended heavily on the national industrial relations system and the power balances within that system. 40 Some countries effectively protected their labour markets by imposing local wage standards on the foreign companies. Other countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, had a more liberal reaction, allowing for the creation of a multi-tiered labour market in which the first tier consists of nationally embedded employment and the second of posted workers, which enjoyed partial embedding at best. 41 The protectionist position is further divided depending on the role played by the social partners. At the time Menz conducted his research Denmark and Sweden were among the most effective countries when measured against the standard of being able to offer workers posted to the territory equivalent protection to workers with purely domestic contracts. Whereas the responses in Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands operated largely within the rules of private international law, Denmark and Sweden relied on the system of industrial relations to re-embed transnational employment. This voluntary system, which operated outside the context of private international law, was more encompassing than the more legalistic responses in the other member states.
Both the Rome Convention and the EEC-Treaty allowed the host states to apply their mandatory rules of labour protection -and in particular the rules on minimum wages -to workers posted within the territory. The concept of overriding mandatory provisions in Article 7 Rome Convention provided the legal base for this. This provision is now laid down in Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. According to Article 9, first paragraph "Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation." This definition was 'borrowed' from the CJEU in the Arblade case which dealt with Belgian rules of labour protection (lois de police). Application of overriding mandatory rules compromises the harmonising effect of the Rome I Regulation. This means that Article 9 should be interpreted restrictively. However, it can be inferred from the case law of the CJEU that also according to the CJEU the protection of workers could be an essential interest meriting the use of Article 9.
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Labour law traditionally doesn't only have a protective character, but also a regulatory one. It regulates the extent to which employment conditions may shape the competition on the market for goods and services. Moreover, labour law is part of a system of industrial relations and a key element of the system of redistribution of the social welfare state. As a result, several countries traditionally have applied their 13 labour law on a strictly territorial basis. 43 Though the application of host state rules is likely to hamper the free provision of services, the court of justice acknowledged in a series of cases that such restrictions could be legitimate for the protection of workers as long the rules are transparent and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner , and the application is proportionate and effectively increases the protection of the workers concerned. The latter requirement points towards an individual rights approach to the protection of workers, but initially this message did not register. In 1996 the posting of workers directive was enacted, but Menz concluded in 2005 that the directive had no discernible impact on the position of the member states. This changed dramatically with the judgments which became known as the 'Laval quartet'. Three of those cases -Laval, Commission v Luxembourg and Rüffert directly concern the posting of workers. 44 The fourth (Viking) deals with collective action against a plan to 'reflag' a ferry service from Finland to Estonia. 45 This latter case will not be discussed here.
Dis-embedding by court order: the PWD in action
Again, the developments with regards to the embedding of transnational employment can only be understood in the context of the economic and political developments of the time. In this context the accession of ten new member states in 2004 (the big bang) followed by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013 changed the EU landscape considerably. Not only did the wage differential between the member states move from 1:3 in 1996 to 1: 10 in 2016. 46 The new accessions also changed the balance between member states with densely regulated labour markets and an advanced system of industrial relations on the one hand and those with less dominant industrial relations systems on the other hand in favour of the latter group. 
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The infamous Laval case is set against the backdrop of the big bang. 48 It deals with a conflict between the Swedish trade unions and a Latvian company which employed Latvian workers on a construction site in Sweden run by a Swedish contractor. The Swedish contractor and the Latvian employer, though different legal entities, were part of a single undertaking. The Swedish unions wanted the Latvian company to sign the sector agreement and enter into negotiations over a site agreement, as is the usual procedure in Sweden. When the employer refused, the unions called a solidarity strike and effectively put the Latvian company out of business. 49 In the preliminary procedure the CJEU had to answer a set of questions which would influence two distinct but related aspects of the regulation of cross-border posting in the EU. The first aspect relates to the possibility to extent the minimum protection offered by the PWD; the second pertains to the role of the trade unions and the national systems of industrial relations in the protection of posted workers. The combined result is that the PWD narrows down the possibility for the host state to re-embed the transnational employment relations -either through their industrial relations system or through the creation of overriding mandatory provisions.
The PWD obliges the host member state to ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship, the posting undertakings guarantee their workers certain minimum rights under host state law and/or collective agreements which are generally binding. 50 The PWD specifies the content of this 'hard core' of labour rights, which covers inter alia safety and health, maximum work periods and minimum rest periods and the minimum rates of pay. In the Laval case, the CJEU stipulated that these rights do not only constitute a minimum but also a maximum: The host state may extend the set of rights, but only in as far as the additional rights are based on public policy provisions. 51 In the Laval case the court also suggested that wage levels which do not constitute a minimum wage, cannot be imposed either. 52 This position was later mitigated in the Ammattiliitto case in which the CJEU accepted that all elements of a wage structure could be part of the minimum rates of pay. 53 But the basic premise that the PWD limits the areas of protection which the host state may prescribe, still stands.
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The result is that the employment relationship of the posted worker is governed in part by the rules of the home state and in part by the rules of the host state. The host state sets rules on safety and health minimum rates of pay, working time and holiday, non-discrimination, protection of special groups (women/children) and the use of temporary work agencies. But with regard to workers posted to its territory it cannot set standards as to the other aspects of the employment relationship, such as fixed term contracts, the right to unilaterally change the contract, parental leave and the termination of the contract including dismissal.
This splitting up of the single legal relationship into subsets of questions governed by different laws (dépeçage) disrupts the coherence of the legal systems involved and thereby may diminish the effectiveness of the protection offered by each of them. 55 Several labour law scholars have argued that the effectiveness of the core protection depends to a large extent on effective protection against dismissal: does the worker feel empowered to assert his legal position? 56 Another clear example of interlocking protection is offered by the position of pregnant women and women who have recently given birth. Safety and health rules may contain prohibitions to put pregnant women to work in certain places. The employment law may contain protection against dismissal and a right to pregnancy and maternity leave, whereas the social security system may provide for a substitute income during leave. When these different elements are taken from different laws, the result may be less than consistent, making full enjoyment of the rights granted difficult or impossible.
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Article 3 paragraph 10 allows the extension of the protection offered by the host state to provisions having a public policy character. However, if a Member States avails itself of this possibility, it can only do so within the confines of the free movement provisions. 58 Both requirements together seriously restrict the possibility to apply national rules which are not covered by the 'hard core' of Article 3 PWD. This became evident in the 2008 case of Commission v. Luxembourg in which the court basically restricted art. 3(10) to provisions which aim to counter 'a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society'. 59 Labour law rules will rarely meet that threshold.
Belgium, France and Luxembourg traditionally consider the major part of their labour law to fall within the category of public policy provisions. This is exemplified by the fact that labour law in these countries 55 It may also put the redistributive character of the rules at risk. is largely enforceable by criminal law penalties. The public policy character is also extended to the rules on collective labour law -protecting both collective negotiations and the ensuing collective agreements by public law means. 60 However, in Commission v Luxembourg, the court specified that rules on collective labour law as such do not qualify as public policy provisions in the meaning of Article 3(10) of the PWD. Only specific provisions in (generally applicable) collective agreements may qualify as such. Hence, the host state may not impose a duty to negotiate to foreign companies providing services within the territory even when such a duty would exist for domestic companies. The safeguarding of the system of industrial relations as such is not a public policy interest in the meaning of the PWD. Though this question was not put before the CJEU, it is likely that in the pre-PWD days, this interest wouldn't be recognized as a justification for hampering the free provision of services either: in its case law on the free provision of services the court specified that protection of workers is a legitimate public interest which may warrant restrictions to this fundamental freedom, but the provisions imposed must 'confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which significantly adds to their social protection'.
61
Provisions which offer only systematic protection -e.g. by organizing labour in a certain way -do not seem to pass the rule of reason test.
National labour law systems are very diverse in the way they organize the protection of workers. Some countries put an emphasis on legislation, others are purely voluntary in nature, yet others corporatist. The PWD sought to cater for these differences by allowing different ways of standard setting with regard to the hard core protection offered by host states. However, in the Laval case the court found that the Swedish way of imposing protective standards by industrial action was not covered by any of the options contained in the PWD. In the Rüffert case also a social clause in a German public procurement contract was struck down by the CJEU. The clause obliged the contractor to abide by a non-generally binding regional collective agreement. According to the CJEU this clause did not comply with the directive read in combination with the treaty provisions on free provision of services. Also on this issue the CJEU recently seems to have (slightly) changed its position. In the RegioPost case 62 the Court did allow the local contracting authority to impose a minimum wage provision on the service provider. The Court not only distinguished to two cases on the basis of the facts, but also relied on a change of legislation: Article 26 of Directive 2004/18 on public procurement, which was adopted after the Rüffert judgment, specifically authorizes the inclusion of social clauses in public procurement contracts.
From the perspective of embeddedness, the Laval quartet was highly disruptive. The embedding of employment contracts is not only a matter of legislation but also very much a result of the wider fabric of socio-economic organization. Standards of behaviour are set not only by law, but also by collective negotiations, workers involvement at the level of the company and rules on (public and private ) procurement and subcontracting. If these non-legislative methods are obstructed by EU law, the result is a forced dis-embedding of transnational employment. 63 This is evidenced by the aftermath of the Laval judgment in Sweden. After the judgement, foreign service providers became much less willing to sign Swedish collective agreements. If they still did so, this would usually be upon special request of the procuring enterprise and/or the main contractor. 64 In those cases the procuring enterprise or main contractor is established in the host country and doesn't want to risk social unrest which might affect their relationship with the unions as well. 65 The Ammattiliitto and RegioPost cases suggest that the backlash of Laval was not entirely lost upon the CJEU. Both can be seen as part of a larger re-embedding programme within the EU.
Narratives and counter-narratives
The discussion on posting of workers is set in the key of the internal market. As a result the debate to a large extent revolves around the question of fair versus unfair competition. The two most important elements of labour law which impact on labour costs are wage regulations and working time. The third problem area is safety and health -albeit for other reasons. Other aspects may cause problems in individual cases, but are mostly absent from the public debate. As fair competition is central in the debate, it is important to note that the concept of fair competition is not clearly defined in EU law. In his article "One law, two competitions' Saydé describes two approaches to the single market which can be discerned in the case law of the CJEU. 66 In the one approach, the single market is based on regulatory competition: economic actors may exploit the difference between the legal systems of the Member States to reach a comparative advantage. This approach seems to inform the Viking case, in which the court seems to assume that the employer's right to change the legal embedding of workers on a transnational ferry services is inherent to the freedom of establishment. The other approach is described as 'regulatory neutrality'. In this second approach competition should not be effected by the regulatory framework, but should be based on other aspects e.g. efficiency, availability, quality. The regulatory neutrality paradigm requires a level playing field in which all competitors are bound by the same set of rules. The Rush Portuguesa judgment is to a large extent based on this latter paradigm. Both the case law and the policy documents of the Commission demonstrate oscillating positions between the two poles.
The posting of workers directive tries to establish an uneasy compromise between the two diverging paradigms of fairness. An effort which is doomed to be and remain controversial as the two paradigms are based on radically different political positions. highly embedded labour market (e.g. The Netherlands, Belgium) competition on the basis of labour conditions is even more strictly controlled, e.g. by widespread coverage of sectoral collective agreements. Other Member States might have a far more liberalized labour market (e.g. UK). These different political preferences also play out at the European level. There the dispute is often framed in terms of free movement of services versus protection of workers. And as mentioned above, the latter is framed in individual terms: host state protection can only be justified if it offers real additional protection to the workers involved. But if host state protection is meant to benefit the posted workers at the individual level, can these workers renounce their rights in order to be more competitive?
An interesting line of reasoning which entered the debate in recent years, frames the discussion in terms of centre and periphery. In this frame attention is drawn to the fact that posting between the old member states themselves (e.g. from Germany to The Netherlands) is not deemed problematic. It's only when the movement takes place from the periphery to the centre (e.g. from Poland to Germany) that friction arises. 67 Whereas the possibility to post workers is largely welcomed by the new 'peripheral' member states, it meets with political opposition in the old 'centre'. This difference in interests and perspective is evident from the list of objectors to the new proposal on posting which aims (inter alia) to instate the right to equal pay for equal work for posted workers: whereas Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden are in favour of an equal pay rule, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania are against.
This difference in both interest and perspective is well-known and already played out in the early days of posting. However, the new line of reasoning draws our attention to the fact that the benefits of the four freedoms are not distributed equally amongst the member states. The freedom to provide services is seen by these authors as the one freedom in which the periphery has a competitive advantage over the centre -because the wage level in the periphery is much lower than in the centre they can offer their services at a lower price. The old centre, which is deemed to have benefitted most from the other freedoms, should not block the periphery from claiming their one advantage. A Polish think tank expresses this in the most eloquent manner by stating that the French have wine, the Dutch tulips and Poland workers. 68 If French wine and Dutch tulips are allowed to move freely, so should the Polish workers. In my view the centre-periphery perspective is an important addition to the discussion. It rightly points out that the effect of the free provision of services on competition cannot be studied in isolation However, in the current context it also lays bare the dis-embedding effect of posting of workers: the slogan of the Polish think-tank epitomizes the commodification of labour in the internal market.
effect of the rules on the free provision of services on industrial relations and industrial citizenship. EU law has impacted negatively on the powers of unions and social partners to impose standards. In the Viking and Laval cases, the right of collective action was restricted by EU law. But the interpretation given to the PWD by the CJEU also seems to restrict the possibility for the social partners to jointly impose their standards on foreign services providers. And finally, under the Rüffert judgement collective agreements which are not generally binding cannot be referred to as the standard to be applied in public procurement contracts. These restrictions impact upon the position of the social partners within the host state.
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Posting of workers also affects industrial relations in a different way, directly linked to industrial citizenship. 71 Citizenship implies membership of a political community and the right to participate in the political life within that community. Industrial citizenship is expressed in membership of unions and employers organisations as well as in participation in workplace democracy. Work place democracy is determined by the law applying to the employer -as legal entity and/or enterprise. This law is determined by to the location of the employer -be it the legal entity or the enterprise. Posting situation are characterised by the fact that the employer is not established in the member state in which the service is performed. Accordingly, host state law will not govern this element of industrial citizenship. But in practice, the posted workers may not be able to benefit from the rights granted to them in the home state either.
As far as industrial relations are concerned, whether or not posted workers join unions and employers join the employers' organisations in the host state is as much a factual question as a legal one. Even when there are no legal obstacles to join the industrial relations network of the host state, there might not be any incentive to do so. Which brings us to the aspect of social embeddedness. As mentioned in the introduction, Polanyi's theory has spawned a distinct sociological offspring. This is also true in the case of posted workers. In recent years several authors (Lilly, Berntsen, Wagner) have studied the actual level of (non)integration of posted workers in the host state and the effects thereof. 72 These studies aim to identify groups of workers who are at risk of being exploited because of their precarious position in the host state. The studies do not only cover workers who are posted in the technical-legal meaning of the word, but tend to cover all workers who migrate as part of a de facto dependent employment relationship. 73 These employment relationships are characterized by isolation from the host state social environment and continued dependence on the employer for housing, transport etc. 
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demonstrate that the high level of social dis-embedding puts the posted workers at risk of being exploited.
These alternative perspectives are important for two reasons. They try to capture the wider societal cost of posting -mainly in the host state but to some extent also in the home state. Moreover, they offer valuable insights into the reasons why the application and enforcement of labour standards is so problematic in the case of posted workers.
In the case of posting in the technical-legal meaning, both the worker and the employer are external to the country in which the work is performed. That means that neither is firmly embedded in the host state. There might be a lack of knowledge of the applicable rules, the workers might not be in a position to enforce their rights and sometimes there even exists a mutual interest in non-conformity with the rules. 74 The host state rules are not part of the normal embedding of the employment relationship.
Individual workers will make a personal assessments of benefits and costs of claiming their rights. The individual employers will likewise assess the risks and benefits of noncompliance. This balance will be struck differently when both workers and employer are active in het host state on a temporary basis only compared to the situation when both have their home base there. So one can hardly expect compliance and enforcement to be generated from within the individual employment context. 75 Outside pressure is needed.
One of the characteristics of posting of workers in the context of the provision of services, is that the service recipient often does have his home base in the host state. Whether it is the government in case of procurement, the main contractor in case of subcontracting, or the user company in case of temporary work agencies, the end user of the service is often embedded there. The experience of Sweden in the post-Laval period shows how important the role of the user company is in setting and enforcing the employment conditions of the posted workers. On this point we might take inspiration from the work of Ruggie who studied international trade from the perspective of embeddedness. Much of his (later) work was dedicated to holding end user companies in western countries accountable for the working conditions in the supplier plants in the developing world. Likewise, the end users could be persuaded by social pressure, collective action and/or public opinion, to ensure fair employment conditions in their supply and service chains. It is interesting to see if EU law could stimulate, rather than obstruct this type of social responsibility. Both the enforcement directive of 2014 and the new proposal address this aspect of controlling the contract chain.
